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By Gene M. Grossman and Edwin L.-C. Lai0
We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trad-
ing world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two coun-
tries that di⁄er in market size and in their capacities for innovation. After describing
the determination of national patent policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent pro-
tection, we ask, Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the
South? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an
e¢ cient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent
policies is necessary or su¢ cient for global e¢ ciency.(JEL O34, F13)
During the 1980￿ s and early 1990￿ s, the United States and several European countries
expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of
intellectual property in many developing countries. The developed countries made the
upgrading of intellectual property rights (IPRs) one of their highest priorities for the
Uruguay Round of trade talks. Their e⁄orts bore fruit in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which was approved as part
of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round.
TRIPs establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intel-
lectual property. For example, in the area of new technology, it essentially harmonizes
patent policies by requiring countries to grant patents to a broad class of innovations for
a minimum of twenty years and to treat foreign and domestic applicants alike. The agree-
ment also imposes new standards of enforcement, including the requirement of border
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1controls, civil and criminal penalties in some circumstances, and expedited procedures
for disciplining infringement. But IPRs remain a highly contentious issue in interna-
tional relations, because many developing countries believe that TRIPs was forced upon
them by their economically more powerful trading partners and that this move toward
harmonization of patent and other IPR policies serves the interests of the North at the
expense of their own.
In a country that is closed to international trade, the design of a system of IPRs poses
a clear trade-o⁄ to a welfare-maximizing government. By strengthening the protection
of intellectual property, a government provides greater incentives for innovation and
thus the bene￿ts that come from having more and better products. But, at the same
time, it curtails potential competition for ￿rms that have previously innovated and thus
limits the bene￿ts that can be realized from existing products. As William D. Nordhaus
(1969) argued, the optimal patent policy equates the marginal dynamic bene￿t with the
marginal static e¢ ciency loss.
But in an open economy, the trade-o⁄s are not so clear cut. International trade
spreads the bene￿ts of innovation beyond national boundaries. This means that a coun-
try does not reap all of the global bene￿ts that come from protecting intellectual property
within its borders. Moreover, countries di⁄er in their capacities for innovation due to
di⁄erences in skill endowments and technical know-how. It is not obvious how a govern-
ment ought to set its national IPR policy if some of the bene￿ts of its national innovation
accrue to foreigners, if its constituents bene￿t from innovations that are encouraged and
take place beyond its boundaries, and if domestic and foreign ￿rms di⁄er in their ability
to innovate.
Some previous research has addressed the question of whether a country with a
limited capacity to innovate will bene￿t from extending IPRs to foreign inventors. Judith
Chin and Gene M. Grossman (1990) and Alan V. Deardor⁄ (1992) investigated the
welfare e⁄ects of extending patent protection from a country in which innovation takes
place to another country that only consumes the innovative products. These papers
treat the investment in R&D as a once-o⁄ decision, whereas Elhanan Helpman (1993)
models innovation as an ongoing process and associates the strength of the IPR regime
with the ￿ ow probability that a given product protected by a patent in the North will
be imitated in the South. He evaluates the welfare consequences of marginal changes in
the rate of imitation. These papers do not, however, consider the simultaneous choice
2of IPR protection by trade partners, nor do they discuss what international regime of
IPR protection would be globally e¢ cient.1
In this paper, we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual
property in a trading world economy. In our formal analysis, we associate the strength
of IPR protection with an index variable that captures both the length of a country￿ s
patents and the stringency of its enforcement policies. We recognize that, in reality,
governments choose packages of policies that include not only these instruments, but
others such as patent breadth, limits on patentability, compulsory licensing requirements,
copyright and trademark protections, and so on. We believe, however, that our analysis
has broader relevance than would be implied by a literal interpretation of the model,
because many of the factors that determine optimal patent duration and enforcement
would also guide the choice of an optimal package of patent and copyright instruments
in a setting in which governments choose from a wider range of policy tools.
We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in which there are two coun-
tries that di⁄er in market size and in their capacities for conducting research and devel-
opment. Innovators develop the designs for new products, each of which has a limited
economic life. Patents, when fully enforced, provide inventors with exclusive rights to
produce, sell and distribute their products within a country. We study a regime with
national treatment, which means that the same protection is a⁄orded to all inventors
irrespective of their nation of origin.
We begin in Section 2 with the case of a closed economy. There we re-examine the
trade-o⁄ between static costs and dynamic bene￿ts that was ￿rst studied by Nordhaus.
We derive a neat formula that characterizes the optimal patent policy in a closed econ-
omy and discuss the determinants of the optimal strength of patent protection. One
interesting ￿nding is that the optimal index of patent protection may be independent of
or even decreasing in the size of the economy.
In Section 3, we describe the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative
regime of patent protection. In this, we follow Lai and Qiu (2003), but with some
di⁄erences that are better described after the model has been developed. After discussing
the relationship between our paper and that one, we derive best response functions for
1Phillip McCalman (2002) addresses some of these issues in a model of once-o⁄innovation by a single
￿rm in a developed economy. See also Edwin L.-C. Lai and Larry D. Qiu (2003), which we discuss at
greater length below.
3the ￿North￿and the ￿South,￿where the North is assumed to have a higher wage than
the South, as well as possibly a larger market for innovative products and a greater
capacity for innovation. We characterize the nationally optimal policies, compare the
incentives for providing protection for intellectual property in an open economy to those
that exist in a closed economy, and explain the strategic interactions between countries
in the setting of their patent policies.
In Section 4, we ask, Why is IPR protection stronger in the North? If the capacity for
R&D is greater in the North than in the South and the market for innovative products
is at least as large there, then patent protection will be stronger in the North than in
the South in a Nash equilibrium. We explain why relative market size and relative pro-
ductivity in innovation matter for the relative incentives to protect intellectual property.
Patents are a more potent instrument for stimulating innovation in the relatively larger
market. And a country that invents a smaller share of the world￿ s innovative products
will ￿nd more incentive to ease IPR protection so as to bene￿t local consumers at the
expense of producers.
We study international patent agreements in Section 5. First we derive the properties
of an e¢ cient global regime of IPRs. An e¢ cient patent regime is one that provides the
optimal aggregate incentives for innovation to inventors throughout the world. These
incentives can be achieved by various combinations of patent policies in the two coun-
tries, so there is no unique set of policies that is needed for global e¢ ciency. However,
di⁄erent ways of achieving the optimal aggregate incentives have di⁄erent implications
for the distribution of welfare between North and South. Among combinations of poli-
cies that give the same overall incentives for global research, the North fares better, and
the South worse, the stronger is patent protection in the South. An implication of our
￿ndings is that harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for
global e¢ ciency. Moreover, starting from a non-cooperative equilibrium with stronger
IPR protection in the North than in the South, an e¢ cient agreement calling for har-
monization of patent policies bene￿ts the North quite possibly at the expense of the
South.
In Section 6, we extend our analysis of both the non-cooperative and cooperative set-
tings to a world with many trading countries. The many-country model is qualitatively
similar to the two-country model, although the addition of more countries exacerbates
the ine¢ ciencies associated with non-cooperation. Our ￿ndings are summarized in Sec-
4tion 7.
I. A Simple Model of Innovation
In this section, we construct a simple model of ongoing innovation. We develop the
model for a closed economy and use it to revisit the question of optimal patent policy
that was ￿rst addressed by Nordhaus (1969). Our model yields a neat formula that
characterizes the trade-o⁄between the static costs and dynamic bene￿ts of strengthening
patent protection. The discussion of a closed economy lays the groundwork for the more
subtle analysis of the international system that we undertake in the sections that follow.
The economy has two sectors, one that produces a homogeneous good and another
that produces a continuum of di⁄erentiated products. The designs for the di⁄erentiated
products result from private investments in R&D. Once a good has been invented, it has
a ￿nite economic life of length ￿ ￿. That is, a new product potentially provides utility to
consumers for a period of length ￿ ￿ from the time of its creation, whereupon its value to
consumers drops to zero.
There are M consumers with identical preferences. We shall refer to M as the ￿size
of the market.￿ 2 The representative consumer maximizes a utility function of the form
(1) U(t) =
Z 1
t
u(z)e
￿￿zdz
where
(2) u(z) = y(z) +
Z n(z)
0
h[x(i;z)]di,
y(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good at time z, x(i;z) is consumption of the
ith variety of di⁄erentiated product at time z, and n(z) is the measure of di⁄erentiated
products invented before z that still hold value to consumers at time z. We assume
that h0(x) > 0, h00(x) < 0, h0(0) = 1, and ￿xh00(x)=h0(x) < 1 for all x. The third
assumption ensures a positive demand for every variety at any ￿nite price. The fourth
ensures that any ￿rm producing a di⁄erentiated product charges a ￿nite price.
2In our model, demand for di⁄erentiated products does not vary with income. Thus, a rich country
need not have a larger market for these goods than a poor country. Nonetheless, we prefer to think
of the market for di⁄erentiated goods as being larger in the North than in the South. This could be
rigorously justi￿ed within our model if we were to suppose that di⁄erentiated products provide utility
only after a threshold level of consumption of the homogeneous goods has been reached. Then, a rich
country may have more consumers who surpass the threshold.
5A consumer maximizes utility by purchasing some of all varieties that are not yet
obsolete. He chooses x(i;z) so that h0[x(i;z)] = p(i;z) for all i and z, where p(i;z) is
the price of variety i at time z. After the consumer makes all of his optimal purchases of
di⁄erentiated products at time z, he devotes the remainder of his spending to the homo-
geneous good y. Spending is always positive in the equilibria we describe. This means
that the interest rate is constant and equal to ￿, in view of the perfect intertemporal
substitutability of good y in the preferences described by (1) and (2).
Manufacturing requires only labor. Any ￿rm can produce good y with a units of
labor per unit of output. All known varieties of the di⁄erentiated product also can be
produced with a units of labor per unit of output.
The design of new varieties requires both labor and human capital. We take ￿(z) ￿
F[H;LR (z)] = fb[LR(z)=a]
￿ + (1 ￿ b)H￿g1=￿, where ￿(z) is the ￿ ow of new inventions
at time z, H is the (constant) stock of human capital, LR(z) is the amount of labor
devoted to R&D, and a is a measure of labor productivity as before. This is, of course, a
production function with a constant elasticity of substitution between labor and human
capital. We assume that ￿ ￿ 1=2, or equivalently that the elasticity of substitution is
less than or equal to two. This assumption is su¢ cient (but not necessary) to ensure
that any patent policy that satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition for an interior optimum
also satis￿es the second-order condition. Note that _ n(z) = ￿(z)￿￿(z ￿ ￿ ￿), because the
goods that were invented at time z ￿ ￿ ￿ become obsolete at time z.
The government grants the original designer of a di⁄erentiated product a patent of
length ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. The government also chooses the vigor of its enforcement policy, which we
index by ! 2 [0;1]. For simplicity, we take ! to be the probability that a non-expired
patent is enforced by the government at any moment in time.3 If a live patent is enforced
by the government, the holder enjoys exclusive rights to produce and sell the protected
product in the local market.
We describe now the static and dynamic equilibrium for an economy that has a
patent duration of ￿ and an enforcement rate of !. In equilibrium, ￿rms with enforced
patents behave as monopolies. Each such ￿rm faces an inverse demand curve from
each of the M consumers with the form p(x) = h0(x): The ￿rm sets its price so that
(p ￿ aw)=p = ￿xh00=h0, where w is the wage rate and x is sales per consumer. This is
3Alternatively, we might interpret ! as being the fraction of the country￿ s territory in which the
patent is enforced.
6the usual monopoly-pricing rule whereby the markup over unit cost as a fraction of the
price is equal to the inverse demand elasticity. Optimal pricing yields the typical holder
of an enforced patent pro￿ts of ￿ per consumer and total pro￿ts of M￿.
When a live patent is not enforced, competitors imitate the good costlessly. Then the
product sells for the competitive price of p = aw and generates no pro￿ts for the inventor.
Similarly, once a patent expires, the price of the good falls to the competitive level and
remains there until the good becomes obsolete. The homogeneous good always carries
the competitive price of aw, which, because this good is the numeraire, implies that
w = 1=a. In writing this condition, we implicitly assume that the economy￿ s labor supply
is su¢ ciently large that some labor remains for production of the homogeneous good after
all derived demand for labor for producing di⁄erentiated products and conducting R&D
has been satis￿ed.
Labor engages in manufacturing and R&D. The labor employed in manufacturing
di⁄erentiated goods is just the amount needed to produce the quantities demanded at
the equilibrium prices. The allocation of labor to R&D is such that its marginal value
product in this activity is equal to the wage rate. Thus,
(3) vFL (H;LR) = w;
where v is the value of a new patent. A patent is worth the discounted value of the
expected pro￿ts it generates in the time before it expires, or
(4) v =
!M￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ e
￿￿￿￿
:
We see from (3) and (4) that an increase in either patent length or patent enforcement
increases the value of a new patent, thereby drawing additional resources into R&D.
The ￿nal equilibrium condition equates savings with investment. Savings are the
di⁄erence between national income rH +wL+nmM￿ and aggregate spending E, where
r is the return to human capital, L is the aggregate labor supply, and nm is the number
of ￿rms that hold live and enforced patents at a given time. All investment is devoted
to R&D. This activity has an aggregate cost of rH + wLR. Thus, we can write the
equilibrium condition as (rH + wL + nmM￿) ￿ E = rH + wLR, or
(5) E = w(L ￿ LR) + nmM￿.
Before proceeding to the government￿ s maximization problem, it is useful to de￿ne
an index of the strength of IPR protection a⁄orded by the vector of policies (￿;!). First,
7de￿ne T ￿ (1￿e￿￿￿)=￿ as the present discounted value of a ￿ ow of one dollar from time
0 to time ￿. Then de￿ne ￿ ￿ !T. Clearly, (4) can be re-written as v = M￿￿. Thus, ￿
captures the overall incentives that government policy provides for the creation of new
varieties. In what follows we use ￿ as a measure of the strength of IPR protection.
Next, we derive an expression for aggregate welfare at date 0, the time at which a
new (optimal) patent policy will be set by the government. By assumption, this patent
protection applies only to goods introduced after time 0; those introduced beforehand are
subject to whatever policy was in e⁄ect at the time of their invention.4 Our derivation
anticipates a stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of labor to R&D and thus
the rate of innovation, ￿; are constant over time. We substantiate this hypothesis in
footnote 5 below.
At any moment, each consumer enjoys surplus of Cm = h(xm) ￿ pmxm from his
consumption of any good whose live patent is enforced and surplus of Cc = h(xc)￿pcxc
from any di⁄erentiated product that is competitively priced, either because its patent
has expired or because it is not enforced. Here, xm and xc are the amounts purchased
by the consumer from a typical monopoly and competitive supplier, respectively, and
pm and pc are the respective prices. We distinguish now between goods invented before
time 0 and those invented afterward. The former yield some exogenous surplus that is
una⁄ected by the new patent regime. Each good in the latter category yields each of
the M consumers a discounted surplus of Cm￿ + Cc(￿ T ￿ ￿) over its useful life, where
￿ T ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿￿ ￿)=￿. Using (1), (2) and (5), and assuming that new goods are introduced
at a constant ￿ ow ￿ after time 0, we calculate that aggregate welfare at time 0 is
(6) W(0) = ￿0 +
w(L ￿ LR)
￿
+
M￿
￿
(Cm + ￿)￿ +
M￿
￿
Cc(￿ T ￿ ￿) ,
where ￿0 is the discounted present value of the consumer surplus and pro￿ts derived
from goods invented before time 0.
We are now ready to derive the optimal patent policy for a closed economy. Note
that aggregate welfare depends only on the index of patent protection ￿ and not sepa-
rately on the underlying policies ￿ and !. This implies that patent duration and patent
4It would never be optimal for the government to provide patent protection on goods that have
already been invented. This would create deadweight loss without any o⁄setting social bene￿t. The
government might wish to eliminate protection for goods that were invented under a di⁄erent regime,
but we assume that such expropriation of intellectual property would not be legal.
8enforcement are perfect substitutes as instruments of IPR protection and it justi￿es our
use of ￿ as a measure of the strength of the IPR regime. Formally, we maximize W(0)
with respect to ￿, after recalling that ￿ = F(H;LR) and that LR is a function of ￿
via (3) and (4).5 It is more intuitive, however, to describe the social costs and bene￿ts
that derive from a marginal increase in patent protection from a given strength of pro-
tection ￿. The cost of strengthening patent protection is that the economy su⁄ers the
deadweight loss of M (Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) on each newly invented good for a greater fraction
of the product￿ s life. Considering that the constant ￿ ow of new products is ￿ per unit
time, the total discounted marginal cost on all goods invented after time 0 is
￿
￿
M (Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿).
The bene￿t to the economy of strengthening patent policy is that it encourages R&D,
which in turn means a greater variety of di⁄erentiated products. Each di⁄erentiated
product yields discounted consumer surplus of MCm￿ during times when its patent is
active and enforced and surplus of MCc(￿ T ￿ ￿) during times when it is competitively
priced, where in each case the discounting is back to the time of invention. Now if
we discount this ￿ ow of bene￿ts back to time 0, and multiply by the number of new
inventions induced by a marginal strengthening of the patent regime, we have the total
marginal bene￿t, which is equal to
1
￿
￿
d￿
dv
￿
dv
d￿
￿
￿
MCm￿ + MCc(￿ T ￿ ￿)
￿
.
Using (3) we calculate that
d￿
dv
= ￿
￿
v
,
5Equivalently, we can maximize ￿W(0) over the choice of ￿. Note that Cm, Cc and ￿ do not depend
on the strength of patent protection and thus do not depend on ￿ . We can combine (3) and (4) to
write M￿￿FL (H;LR) = w, which allows us to solve for the functional relationship between the labor
devoted to R&D and the policy variable ￿; denote it by LR(￿). Then, substituting this expression into
(6) and rearranging terms, we can write the maximand as
￿W(0) = ￿￿0 + w[L ￿ LR(￿)] + MF [H;LR(￿)]
￿
(Cm + ￿ ￿ Cc)￿ + Cc ￿ T
￿
:
The ￿rst-order condition for a maximum requires
(Cc ￿ Cc ￿ ￿)MF [H;LR(￿)] =
￿
MFL
￿
(Cm + ￿ ￿ Cc)￿ + Cc ￿ T
￿
￿ w
￿
L0
R
from which (7) follows. In the appendix we show ￿ ￿ 1=2 is su¢ cient to ensure that the second-order
condition is satis￿ed at any value of ￿ that satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition (7).
9where ￿ is the ratio of the elasticity of research output with respect to labor to the
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in R&D; i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿(FL)
2 =(FFLL). The
variable ￿ identi￿es the responsiveness of innovation to the protections a⁄orded by the
patent system. In general, it is a function of LR and thus indirectly of the strength of
patent protection ￿: With the CES research technology, ￿ = [b=(1￿b)(1￿￿)](LR=aH)￿.
For the special case of a Cobb-Douglas technology (which is the limiting case of the CES
as ￿ ! 0), ￿ is a constant equal to the ratio of the cost share of labor to the cost share
of human capital.
Next, we use (4) to compute that
dv
d￿
= M￿.
Substituting for d￿=dv and dv=d￿ in the expression for marginal bene￿t, and equating
the result to the marginal cost, we derive an implicit formula for the optimal index of
patent protection. We ￿nd that
(7) Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
Cm + Cc
￿ ￿ T ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
at an (interior) optimal value of ￿.
From (7) we see that the optimal patent protection is stronger, the greater is the
useful life of a product (larger ￿ ￿), the more patient are consumers (smaller ￿), and the
higher is the responsiveness of innovation to strengthened patent protection.6 All of these
￿ndings accord well with intuition. One noteworthy feature of (7) is the relationship
between market size and the optimal strength of patent protection. In a closed economy,
the ￿rst-best level of R&D ￿ that which maximizes discounted utility when all goods are
competitively priced ￿ typically is an increasing function of market size. This is because
innovation is a public good, and the Samuelsonian rule for optimal provision of a public
good calls for greater output when the bene￿ts can be spread across more consumers.
But the encouragement of innovation by patents achieves only a second best. According
to (7), the size of the market M a⁄ects the optimal index of patent protection only
through its e⁄ect on the supply elasticity of innovations. If ￿ is an increasing function
of LR, as it will be if 1=2 > ￿ > 0, then the optimal ￿ is an increasing function of M.
But if ￿ is a decreasing function of LR, as it will be if ￿ < 0, then the optimal ￿ is
6The proof of these statements makes use of the second-order condition, which ensures that the
right-hand side of (7) is a declining function of ￿.
10a decreasing function of M. In the benchmark Cobb-Douglas case (with ￿ = 0), ￿ is
independent of LR and therefore of market size. Then an increase in M enhances the
marginal bene￿t of strengthening patent protection and the marginal cost of doing so in
equal proportions. The optimal strength of patent protection in a closed economy with
a Cobb-Douglas research technology is invariant to market size.
II. Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, we study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property
in a world economy with imitation and trade. We derive the Nash equilibria of a game
in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively.
The countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their stocks
of human capital. The last of these proxies for their di⁄erent capacities for R&D. We
shall term the countries ￿North￿and ￿South,￿in keeping with our desire to understand
the tensions that surrounded the tightening of IPR protection in the developing coun-
tries in the last decade. Keith E. Maskus (2000a, ch.3) has documented an increase
in innovative activity in poor and middle-income countries such as Brazil, Korea, and
China, so our model of relations between trading partners with positive but di⁄erent
abilities to conduct R&D may be apt for studying the incentives for IPR protection in
a world of trade between such nations and the developed economies.7 But our model
may apply more broadly to relations between any groups of countries that have di⁄er-
ent wages and di⁄erent capacities for research. Such di⁄erences exist, albeit to a lesser
extent than between North and South, in the comparison of countries in Northern and
Southern Europe, or the comparison of the United States and Canada. We do not mean
the labels North and South to rule out the application of our analysis to these other
sorts of relationships.
Before proceeding, we pause to discuss the relationship between the analysis that
will be presented in this section and that contained in Lai and Qiu (2003), which covers
some similar ground. Lai and Qiu also examine a non-cooperative game between two
governments that set national patent policies. They do not, however, model how the
resources used in innovation translate into new goods, but rather assume that at each
moment in time the di⁄erent goods that might be invented have di⁄erent (exogenous)
7He also shows the extent to which patent applications in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are dominated by foreign ￿rms, a feature of the data that ￿gures
in our analysis.
11innovation costs. Speci￿cally, the cost of making ￿ innovations is assumed to be an
increasing, power function of ￿. They also assume that demand for each di⁄erentiated
product is iso-elastic and that the discount rate is zero. With our more general utility
function and our explicit treatment of the R&D technology, we are able to explain when
and why the countries￿patent policies are strategic substitutes or strategic complements
based on the technology for innovation￿ speci￿cally, the substitutability between human
capital and mobile resources in the R&D activity. Perhaps more importantly, we are
able to provide an intuitive discussion of why and how a government￿ s incentives for
protecting intellectual property in an open economy di⁄er from those it would face
in a world without trade, whereas Lai and Qiu focus only on the algebra of a single,
parameterized example of a trading economy.
A. The Global IPR Regime
The model is a natural extension of the one presented in Section 2. Consumers
in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the representative
consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function in (1). The instantaneous utility
of a consumer in country j now is given by
(8) uj(z) = yj(z) +
Z nS(z)+nN(z)
0
h[xj(i;z)]di;
where yj(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country j at
time z, xj(i;z) is consumption of the ith di⁄erentiated product by a resident of country
j at time z; and nj(z) is the number of di⁄erentiated varieties previously invented in
country j that remain economically viable at time z. There are MN consumers in the
North and MS consumers in the South. While we do not place any restrictions on the
relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most interested in the case
where MN > MS.8 It does not matter for our analysis whether consumers can borrow
and lend internationally or not.
In country j, it takes aj units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous good or
to produce one unit of any variety of the di⁄erentiated product. New goods are invented
in each region according to ￿j = F (Hj;LRj=aj) =
h
b(LRj=aj)
￿ + (1 ￿ b)H
￿
j
i1=￿
, where
Hj is the human capital endowment of country j, LRj is the labor devoted to R&D
8We remind the reader that market size is meant to capture not the population of a country, but
rather the scale of its demand for innovative products.
12there, and again we take ￿ ￿ 1=2. We assume that aN < aS, which means that labor is
uniformly more productive in the North than in the South.9 We also assume that the
numeraire good is produced in positive quantities in both countries, so that wj = 1=aj
for j = S;N; and hence wN=wS = aS=an > 1.
We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in the
granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country j a⁄ords
the same protection ￿j = !jTj to all inventors of di⁄erentiated products regardless of
their national origins, where !j is the probability that a patent is enforced in country j
at any moment in time, Tj = (1 ￿ e￿￿￿j)=￿, and ￿j is the length of the patents granted
by country j. In other words, we assume that foreign ￿rms and domestic ￿rms have
equal standing in applying for patents in any country and that all patents are subject
to the same enforcement provisions. National treatment is required by TRIPs and it
characterized the laws that were in place in most countries even before this agreement.10
In our model, a patent is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a
￿xed period of time (see Maskus, 2000a, p.36). This means that, when good i is under
patent protection in country j, no ￿rm other than the patent holder or one designated
by it may legally produce the good in country j for domestic sale or for export, nor
may the good be legally imported into country j from an unauthorized producer outside
the country. We also rule out parallel imports ￿ unauthorized imports of good i that
were produced by the patent holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party
outside country j.11 When parallel imports are prevented, patent holders can practice
9In Grossman and Lai (2002), we allowed the relative productivity of labor to vary in di⁄erent uses;
i.e., we allowed for Ricardian comparative advantage across the regions. This feature caused some subtle
complications that we ignore here for the sake of simplicity and greater clarity.
10National treatment is required by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, to which 127 countries subscribed by the end of 1994 and 164 countries subscribe today (see
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/paris/index.html). There were, however, allegations from ￿rms in
the United States and elsewhere that prior to the signing of TRIPS in 1994, nondiscriminatory laws
did not always mean nondiscriminatory practice. See Suzanne Scotchmer (2002) for an analysis of the
incentives that countries have to apply national treatment in the absence of an enforcible agreement.
11The treatment of parallel imports under TRIPs remains a matter of legal controversy. Countries
continue to di⁄er in their rules for territorial exhaustion of IPRs. Some countries, like Australia and
Japan, practice international exhaustion, whereby the restrictive rights granted by a patent end with
the ￿rst sale of the good anywhere in the world. Other countries or regions, like the United States and
the European Union, practice national or regional exhaustion, whereby patent rights end only with the
13price discrimination across national markets.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-and-
for-all at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods invented
beforehand continue to receive the protections a⁄orded at their times of invention. So
long as the governments cannot remove protections that were previously granted, the
economy has no state variables that bear on its choice of optimal patent policies at
a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-and-for-all
patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the in￿nitely repeated game in which
the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even continuously. Of
course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the governments base their
current policies on the history of prior actions. We do not investigate such equilibria
with tacit cooperation here, but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until
Section 5.
Let us describe, for given patent strengths ￿N and ￿S, the life cycle of a typical
di⁄erentiated product. During an initial phase after the product is introduced, the
inventor holds an active patent in both countries that is randomly and intermittently
enforced. The patent holder earns an expected ￿ ow of pro￿ts of !NMN￿ from sales
in the Northern market and an expected ￿ ow of pro￿ts of !SMS￿ from sales in the
Southern market, where ￿ is earnings per consumer for a monopoly selling a typical
brand. Notice that monopoly pro￿ts per consumer are the same for sales in both markets,
because consumers share identical preferences. Also, they do not depend on where a
good was invented or where it is produced, because the productivity gap between the
countries exactly o⁄sets the wage di⁄erential.12 Each Northern consumer realizes a ￿ ow
of expected surplus of !NCm + (1 ￿ !N)Cc from his purchases of the good, where Cm
is the surplus that a consumer derives from purchases of a good produced at a cost of
wjaj = 1 and sold at the monopoly price pm and Cc is the surplus he derives from a
product sold for the competitive price of pc = 1. Similarly, a Southern consumer realizes
an expected ￿ ow of consumer surplus of !SCm + (1 ￿ !S)Cc from his purchases of the
￿rst sale within the country or region. Under such rules, patent holders can prevent parallel trade. See
Maskus (2000b) for further discussion.
12In Grossman and Lai (2002), where we allowed for comparative technological advantages across
di⁄erent uses of labor, we were forced to consider separately situations in which direct foreign investment
is and is not a possibility. However, our conclusions were qualitatively similar for the two cases.
14good.
After a while, the patent will expire in one country. For concreteness, let￿ s say that
this happens ￿rst in the South. Then the good will be legally imitated by competitive
￿rms producing there, for sales in the local (Southern) market. The imitators will not,
however, be able to sell the good legally in the North, because the live patent there, if
enforced, a⁄ords protection from such infringing imports. When the patent expires in
the South, the price of the good falls permanently to wSaS = 1, and the original inventor
ceases to realize pro￿ts in that market. The ￿ ow of consumer surplus in the South rises
to MSCc.
Eventually, the inventor￿ s patent expires in the North. Then the Northern market
can be served completely by competitive ￿rms producing in either location. At this time,
the price of the good in the North falls to pc = 1 and households there begin to enjoy the
higher ￿ ow of consumer surplus MNCc. The original inventor loses his remaining source
of monopoly income. Finally, after a period of length ￿ ￿ has elapsed from the moment of
invention, the good becomes obsolete and all ￿ ows of consumer surplus cease.
B. The Best Response Functions
We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two governments.
The best response expresses the strength of patent protection that maximizes a country￿ s
aggregate welfare as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. Consider
the choice of ￿S by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from
strengthening its patent protection slightly. First, it expands the fraction of goods
previously invented in the South on which the country su⁄ers a static deadweight loss of
MS(Cc ￿Cm ￿￿). Second, it augments the fraction of goods previously invented in the
North on which its consumers realize surplus of MSCm instead of MSCc. Notice that
the pro￿ts earned by Northern producers in the South are not an o⁄set to this latter
marginal cost, because they accrue to patent holders in the North. The marginal bene￿t
that comes to the South from strengthening its patent protection re￿ ects the increased
incentive that Northern and Southern ￿rms have to engage in R&D. If the welfare-
maximizing ￿S is positive and less than ￿ T, then the marginal bene￿t per consumer of
increasing ￿S must match the marginal cost, which implies
(9) ￿S(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) + ￿N(Cc ￿ Cm) =
￿S￿S + ￿N￿N
v
MS￿
￿
Cm￿S + Cc(￿ T ￿ ￿S)
￿
,
where v = (MS￿S + MN￿N)￿ is the value of a new patent and ￿j is the responsiveness
15of innovation in region j to changes in the value of a patent (in elasticity form).
Similarly, in the North, the marginal bene￿t of strengthening patent protection must
match the marginal cost at any interior point on the best response curve. The marginal
cost in the North is di⁄erent from that in the South, because the North￿ s national
income includes the pro￿ts earned by Northern patent holders but not those earned by
Southern patent holders. The marginal bene￿t di⁄ers too, because the e⁄ectiveness of
patent policy as a tool for promoting innovation varies according to the importance of a
country￿ s market in the aggregate pro￿ts of potential innovators and because the surplus
from a typical product over its lifetime depends upon a country￿ s patent regime. The
condition for the best response of the North, analogous to (9) above, is
(10) ￿S(Cc ￿ Cm) + ￿N(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) =
￿S￿S + ￿N￿N
v
MN￿
￿
Cm￿N + Cc(￿ T ￿ ￿N)
￿
.
Noting that ￿S = ￿N = ￿, 13 the two best response functions can be written similarly
as
(11) Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿i￿ = ￿
Mi￿i
MS￿S + MN￿N
￿
Cm + Cc(
￿ T ￿ ￿i
￿i
)
￿
for i = S;N,
where ￿i = ￿i=(￿S + ￿N) is the share of world innovation that takes place in country i.
This form of the best response function facilitates a comparison of the incentives that
a government has for protecting intellectual property in a world with trade compared
to those that exist when there is no trade, as expressed in (7). On the left-hand side of
(11), the government of a open economy considers only a fraction of the pro￿ts that ￿ ow
13The fact that the two supply elasticities ￿S and ￿N are equal despite the di⁄erences in human capital
endowments, in employment, and in labor productivity is a property of the CES research technology.
It follows from the observation that
￿i =
b
(1 ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
LRi
aiHi
￿￿
and vFL(LRi=ai;Hi) = wi; or
vb
ai
"
b + (1 ￿ b)
￿
LRi
aiHi
￿￿￿# 1￿￿
￿
=
1
ai
.
Combining the two, we ￿nd ￿S = ￿N = ￿, where
￿ =
b
1 ￿ ￿
"￿
1
bv
￿ ￿
1￿￿
￿ b
#￿1
.
16to patent holders to be an o⁄set to the static cost of patent protection. On the right-
hand side, the ability of an open economy to stimulate innovation with a given change
in patent protection is a fraction of what it is in a closed economy, because inventors
earn only part of their discounted pro￿ts within the country￿ s borders. Both of these
forces point to weaker patent protection in an open economy than would be optimal
in the absence of trade. Against this, possibly, is the di⁄erence between the supply
elasticities for innovation in the closed and open economies; the presence of a foreign
country o⁄ering protection for innovators may increase the responsiveness of innovation
to home patent policy if ￿ is an increasing function of LR. However, with the CES
research technology ￿ is in fact a non-increasing function of LR whenever ￿ ￿ 0; i.e.,
when the elasticity of substitution between human capital and labor is less than or equal
to one. It follows that14
Proposition 1 Let the research technology be ￿i =
h
b[LRi=ai]￿ + (1 ￿ b)H
￿
i
i1=￿
in coun-
try i, for i = S;N. If ￿ ￿ 0, patent protection is weaker in each country in any Nash
equilibrium than it would be if the country were closed to international trade.
If the research technology in each country takes a Cobb-Douglas form (i.e., ￿ = 0),
the supply elasticity ￿ is a constant equal to b=(1 ￿ b). Moreover, ￿i = Hi=(HS + HN)
for any CES research technology.15 Thus, both ￿i and ￿ are independent of the patent
policies in the Cobb-Douglas case. It follows from (11) that the best response functions
are linear and downward sloping in this case, and that the best response function for the
South is steeper than that for the North, when the two are drawn in (￿S;￿N) space.
14Suppose the government of an open economy were to choose the autarky strength of patent pro-
tection. The marginal cost of strengthening protection would be greater in the open compared to the
closed economy, since ￿i < 1. And, since ￿0(LR) ￿ 0 and Mi￿i=(MS￿S + MN￿N) < 1, the marginal
bene￿t from strengthening the protection would be smaller in the open as compared to the closed econ-
omy. Thus, the marginal cost would exceed the marginal bene￿t in the open economy, which means
that the government would have reason to reduce the index of patent protection from the autarky level.
15Note that
￿i = Hi
"
b
￿
LRi
aiHi
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ b)
# 1
￿
.
From the fact that vFL(LRi=ai;Hi) = wi, we have that LRi=aiHi takes on a common value in the two
countries; see footnote 13. It follows that ￿i is proportional to Hi, with the same factor of proportionality
in both countries.
17More generally, the best response functions need not be linear, but they must be
downward sloping whenever ￿ ￿ 0; i.e., when the elasticity of substitution between
human capital and labor in designing new products is less than or equal to one. Thus,
the patent policies of the two countries are strategic substitutes in such circumstances.
To understand the strategic interdependence between the governments in choosing their
policies, consider the choice of patent protection by the South. Suppose the North were
to strengthen its patent protection; i.e., to increase ￿N. This would shrink the fraction
of total discounted pro￿ts that an innovator earns in the South and so, ceteris paribus,
reduce the responsiveness of global innovation to patent policy in the South. Moreover,
the increase in ￿N would draw labor into R&D in the North and South. If ￿ < 0,
the elasticity of innovation with respect to patent value would fall. The South would
￿nd that its market is relatively less important to potential innovators and that these
innovators are less responsive to its patent policy. For both reasons, the marginal bene￿t
to the South of strengthening its patent protection would fall and so the government
would respond to the increase in ￿N with a reduction in patent length or an easing of
enforcement.
A situation of strategic complementarity (i.e., upward-sloping best response func-
tion) can arise only if the supply elasticity of R&D rises as the size of the research
sector expands (￿ > 0) and then only if it rises su¢ ciently much to compensate for
the decline in relative importance of a country￿ s market that results when its trading
partner strengthens its patent protection. It is straightforward to show that the two best
response functions must slope in the same direction at any point of intersection. Thus,
if the two patent policies are strategic complements in one country, they are strategic
complements in both.
Returning to the case with ￿ ￿ 0, it is easy to show using (11) and d￿=d￿i ￿ 0 that
the best response curve for the South must have a slope that is everywhere greater in
absolute value than MS=MN, while the best response curve for the North must have a
slope that is everywhere smaller in absolute value than MS=MN.16 It follows that the
16We have not discussed the shape of the best response functions where they hit the axes or where
the constraint that ￿i ￿ ￿ T begins to bind. The best-response curve of the South becomes vertical if it
hits the vertical axis at a point below ￿N = ￿ T. It also becomes vertical if the South￿ s best response is
￿ T for some positive value of ￿N. Similarly, the best-response curve for the North becomes horizontal
if either it hits the horizontal axis before ￿S = ￿ T or if the North￿ s best response is ￿ T for some positive
18curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at any point of intersection.
This guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and ensures stability of the policy
setting game.
We summarize the most important ￿ndings in this section as follows.
Proposition 2 Let the research technology be ￿i =
h
b[LRi=ai]￿ + (1 ￿ b)H
￿
i
i1=￿
in coun-
try i, for i = S;N. If ￿ ￿ 0, then the two patent policies are strategic substitutes in
both countries and there exists a unique and stable Nash equilibrium of the policy setting
game.
III. Why is Patent Protection Stronger in the North?
Governments in the North typically provide stronger patent protection than their
counterparts in the South.17 In this section, we identify su¢ cient conditions under
which patent protection in the North will be stronger than that in the South in the
Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative policy game. Our goal here is to understand the
reasons why the North may have a greater incentive to protect IPRs than the South.
We shall also examine how the equilibrium patent policies respond to changes in the
endowments of human capital and to changes in the size of the market in each region.
We organize our discussion of the national di⁄erences in equilibrium policy choices
around the following proposition.18
Proposition 3 Suppose MN > MS and HN > HS. Then ￿N ￿ ￿S in any Nash
equilibrium of the patent policy game. Moreover, ￿N > ￿S unless ￿S = ￿ T.
The proposition is readily proved using the expressions for the best response functions
in (11).19 First, recall that with a CES research technology, ￿i = Hi=(HS + HN).
value of ￿S. Thus, the best response curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at
any point of intersection, even if these additional segments of the best response functions are taken into
account.
17See, for example, Juan C. Ginarte and Walter G. Park (1997) who have constructed an index of
patent rights and have shown that this index is highly correlated with per capita GDP.
18Lai and Qiu (2003) provide conditions under which the Nash equilibrium patent duration is longer
in the North than in the South. Recall, however, that their model is considerably less general than
ours. Moreover, their conditions include that the North invents more goods at every moment than the
South, whereas our Proposition 3 refers only to the primitives of the model.
19There are some details involving corner solutions with ￿S = 0 or ￿N = ￿ T that we leave to the
interested reader.
19Thus, HN > HS implies ￿N > ￿S. The left-hand side of (11) is a decreasing function
of ￿i. If we cancel the terms that are common to the two best response functions,
the remaining expression on the right-hand side is an increasing function of Mi and a
decreasing function of ￿i. It follows that if ￿N > ￿S and MN > MS, a pair of policies
can be mutual responses only if ￿N > ￿S.
Our answer to the question in the section heading is that the North has a larger
market for innovative goods and a greater capacity to conduct R&D. Why do these
characteristics induce the Northern government to provide stronger patent protection
in a noncooperative equilibrium than its counterpart in the South? The reasons are
somewhat subtle.
Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that having a large market is not per se
a reason for a government to grant stronger patent protection. The optimal patent
strength in a closed economy can in fact be independent of or even decreasing with
market size, because both the marginal bene￿t of stronger protection and the marginal
costs of the associated distortions are proportional to M for given ￿, and the supply
elasticity may remain the same or even decline as more resources are employed in R&D.
The role of market size in generating di⁄erent incentives for the governments has to do,
instead, with the relative e⁄ectiveness of the countries￿policy instruments. If MN is
larger than MS, innovative ￿rms earn a majority of their pro￿ts in the North. Then,
a given change in ￿N will generate a larger response of global innovation than would
the same change in ￿S. Since patents generate deadweight loss in the country that
a⁄ords the protection, the country that can more e⁄ectively stimulate innovation with
a given strengthening of its patent protection will have an incentive to provide stronger
protection, all else equal.
In our model, the endowment of human capital proxies for the capacity to conduct
R&D. With HN > HS, a majority of the world￿ s research is carried out in the North.
As a consequence, a majority of the world￿ s pro￿ts from innovative products accrue to
residents of the North. In the North, the marginal cost of strengthening patent protection
re￿ ects the attendant loss in consumer surplus on all protected products less the pro￿ts
that are captured by Northern producers. Similarly, the marginal cost of strengthening
patents in the South re￿ ects the loss of consumer surplus there less the pro￿ts captured
by Southern producers. But since the Northern producers earn a majority of the pro￿ts,
the o⁄set to marginal cost is larger in the North than in the South. Accordingly, the
20Figure 1: Comparative Static E⁄ects of an Increase in HS=HN
government of the North has less of a temptation to ease patent protection than that of
the South.
We turn next to the comparative static properties of the model. For this, we
concentrate on the case in which the best response functions are downward sloping,
which necessarily arises when (but not only when) ￿ ￿ 0.
Consider ￿rst the factor endowments. An equiproportionate change in HS and HN
has no e⁄ect on ￿S or ￿N, and thus no e⁄ect on the best response functions or the
Nash equilibrium. Policy outcomes change only when there is a change in the relative
endowments of human capital in the two countries. Suppose HS=HN rises. This increases
the share of innovation that occurs in the South (￿S) and reduces the share in the North
(￿N). From (11) we see that the South￿ s best response curve shifts to the right while
the North￿ s best response curve shifts downward. In Figure 1, we depict the original
best response functions by SS and NN, respectively, and the shifted curves by S0S0 and
N0N0. The equilibrium moves from E to E0, with a reduction in the strength of patent
protection in the North and an increase in patent protection in the South. This result
is consistent with the Ginarte and Park (1997) ￿nding that patent rights are positively
correlated in a cross-national sample with secondary school enrollment rates and with
the share of R&D in GDP.
21We turn to the e⁄ects of market size. If MS and MN grow equiproportionately, the
term Mi￿i=(MS￿S +MN￿N) on the right-hand side of (11) is not a⁄ected at the initial
values of ￿S and ￿N. Then, if ￿ = 0 (Cobb-Douglas research technology), ￿ also is
constant, and there is no e⁄ect on patent policy in either country. However, if ￿ < 0,
the extra resources that are drawn into R&D reduce the supply elasticity of innovation
with respect to the value of a patent. Then the index of patent protection falls in both
countries. This is similar to our ￿nding for a closed economy that, when ￿ < 0, the
optimal strength of IPR protection shrinks when the market for di⁄erentiated products
expands.
Next consider an expansion in the size of the Southern market with no change in
market size in the North. If ￿ = 0, ￿ is constant, and an increase in MS has qualitatively
the same e⁄ects as an increase in ￿S; these e⁄ects are shown in Figure 1, where we
see that the strength of patent protection in the South grows while that in the North
shrinks. However, if ￿ < 0, the increase in MS reduces ￿ at the initial values of ￿S and
￿N. Relative to the situation depicted in Figure 1, there is a further downward shift in
NN and an o⁄setting leftward shift in SS. Indeed, if the supply elasticity of innovation
falls by enough, the SS curve might even shift to its left relative to its initial location
before the market expansion. In such circumstances ￿S might fall as MS grows.
IV. International Patent Agreements
In this section, we study international patent agreements.20 We begin by character-
izing the combinations of patent policies that are jointly e¢ cient for the two countries.21
Then we compare the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the e¢ cient policies, to identify
changes in the patent regime that ought to be e⁄ected by an international treaty. Fi-
nally, we address the issue of policy harmonization. By that point, we will have seen
that harmonization is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for global e¢ ciency. We proceed to
investigate the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent
20See also McCalman (2002), who discusses globally e¢ cient patent policies in his two-country ex-
tension of the Nordhaus (1967) model. Lai and Qiu (2003) consider whether the joint welfare of the
two countries would be increased if the South were to extend its patents so as to be equal in length to
those chosen by the North in a Nash equilibrium.
21Ours is a constrained e¢ ciency, because we assume that innovation must be done privately and that
patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the governments
to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate of innovation
with weaker patents and less deadweight loss.
22policies and ask whether both countries would bene￿t from such an agreement in the
absence of some form of direct compensation.
A. E¢ cient Patent Regimes
We shall begin by showing that the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries
depends only on a measure Q of the overall protection a⁄orded by the international
patent system. This means that the same aggregate world welfare level can be achieved
with di⁄erent combinations of ￿S and ￿N that imply the same overall level of protection.
One particular level of Q￿ call it Q￿￿ maximizes the sum of the countries￿welfare levels.
For a wide range of distributions of world welfare, e¢ ciency is achieved by setting the
individual patent policies so that the overall index of patent protection is Q￿.
In particular, let Q = MS￿S + MN￿N. This measure of global patent protection
weighs the degree of patent protection in each country by the size of the country￿ s market.
A ￿rm that earns a ￿ ow of expected pro￿ts of !SMS￿ for a period of length ￿S in the
South and a ￿ ow of expected pro￿ts of !NMN￿ for a period of ￿N in the North earns
a total discounted sum of expected pro￿ts equal to Q￿. Thus, Q governs the allocation
of resources to R&D in each country, regardless of the particular combination of patent
policies in the separate countries.
Consider the choice of patent policies ￿N and ￿S that will take e⁄ect at time 0 and
apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the countries￿gross welfare levels
at time 0 are analogous to those for a closed economy, as recorded in equation (6). The
aggregate welfare in country i, discounted to time 0, is given by
Wi(0) = ￿i0 +
wi(Li ￿ LRi)
￿
+
Mi(￿S + ￿N)
￿
￿
￿iCm + (￿ T ￿ ￿i)Cc
￿
+
￿i
￿
￿ (MS￿S + MN￿N), for i = S;N; (12)
where ￿i0 is the ￿xed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country i derive
from goods that were invented before time 0.
Summing the expressions in (12) for i = S and i = N, we ￿nd that
￿[WS(0) + WN(0)] = ￿(￿S0 + ￿N0) + wS(LS ￿ LRS) + wN(LN ￿ LRN)
+(MS + MN) ￿ T(￿S + ￿N)Cc ￿ Q(￿S + ￿N)(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) (13)
23Since vS = vN = ￿Q, LRS and LRN are functions of Q.22 The same is true of ￿S and
￿N: It follows that di⁄erent combinations of ￿S and ￿N that yield the same value of Q
also yield the same level of aggregate world welfare.23
If international transfer payments are feasible, then a globally e¢ cient patent regime
must have MS￿S + MN￿N = Q￿, where Q￿ is the value of Q that maximizes the right-
hand side of (13).24 Notice that a range of e¢ cient outcomes can be achieved without the
need for any international transfers. By appropriate choice of ￿N and ￿S, the countries
can be given any welfare levels on the e¢ ciency frontier between that which they would
achieve if ￿S = 0 and ￿N = Q￿=MN and that which they would achieve if ￿S = Q￿=MS
and ￿N = 0.25
Although aggregate world welfare does not vary with the national policies !i and
￿i as long as MS￿S + MN￿N = Q￿, the countries fare di⁄erently under the alternative
combinations of policies that can be used to achieve global e¢ ciency unless compensating
transfers take place. In particular, the welfare of the North increases and that of the
South decreases as ￿S is increased and ￿N is decreased in such a way as to keep the
weighted sum constant. It follows that, absent any international transfer payments,
the countries have a strong con￿ ict of interest over the terms of an international patent
agreement.
B. Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements
22In country i, the allocation of labor to research is determined by
￿QFL(LRi=ai;Hi) = 1=ai.
23This result is anticipated by a similar one in McCalman (1997), who studied e¢ cient patent agree-
ments in a partial equilibrium model of cost-reducing innovation by a single, global monopolist.
24The ￿rst-order condition for maximizing ￿[WS(0) + WN(0)] implies
Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
Cm + Cc
￿
(MS + MN)￿ T ￿ Q￿
Q￿
￿￿
.
The second-order condition is satis￿ed at Q = Q￿ when ￿ ￿ 1=2.
25This statement ignores the ceiling on patent lengths imposed by the ￿nite economic life of dif-
ferentiated products. A more precise statement is that a range of distributions of maximal world
welfare can be achieved by varying ￿S between ￿S = maxf0;(Q￿ ￿ MN ￿ T)=MSg and minfQ￿=MS; ￿ Tg
while varying ￿N between ￿N = minfQ￿=MN; ￿ Tg and maxf0;
￿
Q￿ ￿ MS ￿ T
￿
=MNg in such a way that
MS￿S + MN￿N = Q￿.
24Figure 2: Comparison of Nash Equilibrium and an E¢ cient Patent Regime
How do the e¢ cient combinations of patent policies compare to the policies that
emerge in a noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question ￿ which informs
us about the likely features of a negotiated patent agreement ￿ is illustrated in Figure
2. The ￿gure depicts the best response functions and the e¢ cient policy combinations
on the same diagram.
In the ￿gure, the e¢ cient policy combinations are depicted by the line QQ.26 We
show this line being situated to the right of the SS curve and above the NN curve, which
is a general feature of our model. The reasons are clear. Starting from a point on the
South￿ s best response function, a marginal strengthening of IPR protection in the South
increases world welfare. Such a change in Southern policies has only a second-order e⁄ect
on welfare in the South, but it conveys two positive externalities to the North. First, it
provides extra monopoly pro￿ts to Northern innovators, which contributes to aggregate
income there. Second, it enhances the incentives for R&D, inducing an increase in both
￿S and ￿N. The extra product diversity that results from this R&D creates additional
26If international transfer payments are infeasible, the set of Pareto e¢ cient policy combinations
includes the segment of the vertical axis above its intersection with QQ and extending as far as the
point (0; ￿ T) and the segment of the horizontal axis to the right of its intersection with QQ and extending
to (￿ T;0).
25surplus for Northern consumers.
By the same token, a marginal increase in the strength of Northern patent protection
from a point along NN increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances pro￿t
income for Southern ￿rms and encourages additional innovation in both countries. It
follows, of course, that the QQ line must lie outside the Nash equilibrium. We record
our ￿nding in
Proposition 4 Let (￿S;￿N) be an interior equilibrium in the noncooperative policy
game and let (￿￿
S;￿￿
N) be any e¢ cient combination of patent policies. Then MS￿￿
S +
MN￿￿
N > MS￿S + MN￿N:
The proposition implies that, starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an e¢ cient
patent treaty must strengthen patent protection in at least one country. It also im-
plies that the treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid
innovation in both countries.
C. Harmonization
Commentators sometimes claim that it is desirable to have universal standards for
intellectual property protection and for many other national policies that a⁄ect inter-
national competition. The arguments for harmonization are not always clear, but they
seem to be based on a desire for global e¢ ciency. Yet it is hardly obvious why e¢ ciency
should require identical policies in countries at di⁄erent stages of economic development.
In this section, we examine the aggregate and distributional e⁄ects of international har-
monization of patent policies. It should be noted that TRIPs essentially harmonizes
patent policy by requiring all governments to grant patents of at least twenty years from
date of ￿ling and by requiring minimum standards of e⁄ective enforcement.
As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, harmonization of patent policies
is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for global e¢ ciency, regardless of whether international
transfer payments are feasible or not. A regime of harmonized policies will only be
e¢ cient if the common index of patent protection in the two countries is such that Q =
Q￿. And any combination of patent policies that provides the proper global incentives
for R&D will be e¢ cient, no matter whether the patent policies in the two countries are
the same or not.
If patent protection is stronger in the North than in the South in an initial Nash
equilibrium, then harmonization might be achieved either by a unilateral strengthening
26of patent laws in the South or by a combination of policy changes in the two countries.
A unilateral increase in ￿S is bound to harm the South (absent any side payments),
because the equilibrium policy package is a best response by the South to the North￿ s
choice of patent laws and any unilateral deviation from a country￿ s best response is,
by de￿nition, damaging to its interests.27 As for harmonization that might be achieved
through a combination of policy changes, we focus on a treaty that would achieve global
e¢ ciency. Such a treaty is represented by point H in Figure 2. E¢ cient harmonization
surely requires a strengthening of patent protection in the South, since ￿N > ￿S at E
and QQ lies outside this point. If ￿ ￿ 0, it also requires a strengthening of patent
protection in the North.28 If MN ￿ MS and HN ￿ HS, the North de￿nitely gains from
e¢ cient harmonization.29 However, the South may be worse o⁄ at point H than in
the Nash equilibrium at point E, unless some form of compensation is provided by the
North. In general, the larger are MN=MS and HN=HS, the more likely it is that the
South would lose from e¢ cient harmonization.
Summarizing, we have
Proposition 5 Suppose MN ￿ MS, HN ￿ HS, and ￿ ￿ 0. Then e¢ cient harmoniza-
tion requires a strengthening of patent protection in both countries. The North necessarily
gains from e¢ cient harmonization, while the South may gain or lose.
We conclude that harmonization has more to do with distribution than with e¢ ciency,
27See also Lai and Qiu (2003), who consider the welfare e⁄ects of harmonizing IPR protection at the
standard that would be chosen by the North in a non-cooperative equilibrium. In a model of once-o⁄
investment in R&D, they show that such a change in the South￿ s policy from the Nash equilibrium level
would bene￿t the North by more than it would harm the South.
28First, we note that when ￿ ￿ 0, point H lies above the intersection of the NN curve with the
vertical axis. This can be seen by substituting ￿N = ￿S in the ￿rst-order condition for maximizing
￿[WS(0) + WN(0)] and comparing the resulting expression for ￿N = Q￿=(MN+MS) with the expression
for ￿N that comes from (11) when ￿S = 0. Then, since the NN curve is downward sloping when ￿ ￿ 0,
the fact that it starts below point H implies that the extent of patent protection in the North is greater
at point H than it is at point E.
29If MN ￿ MS and HN ￿ HS, the common index of patent policy that maximizes the welfare of
the North is greater than the common index of patent policy that maximizes aggregate world welfare.
Therefore, the North gains from a unilateral increase in ￿S that brings the Southern patent policy into
conformity with the Nash equilibrium policy in the North, and further gains from an increase in the
common policy until Q = Q￿.
27and that incorporation of such provisions in a treaty like TRIPs might well bene￿t the
North at the expense of the South.30
V. Patent Policy with Many Countries
In this section, we extend our analysis to a trading world with many countries. Our
main ￿nding is that adding countries exacerbates the free-rider problem that plagues
the noncooperative policy equilibrium. Small countries are inclined to allow others to
provide the incentives for innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their home
markets. In the limit, as the number of countries grows large and each one is small
in relation to the world economy, the unique Nash equilibrium has universal patents
of strength zero. Then, a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for private
innovation.
We assume that there are J countries, and that country i has market size Mi, human
capital endowment Hi, and labor productivity 1=ai. The research technology in country
i is ￿i = F (Hi;LRi=ai) =
h
b[LRi=ai]￿ + (1 ￿ b)H
￿
i
i1=￿
, with ￿ ￿ 1=2. All consumers
share the preferences given in (8).
Suppose that there is no cooperation between nations in setting their patent policies.
In country i, either ￿i = 0 and the marginal cost of providing the ￿rst bit of patent
protection exceeds the marginal bene￿t, ￿i = ￿ T and the marginal bene￿t of providing
the last bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal cost, or 0 < ￿i < ￿ T and the
marginal bene￿t of strengthening patent protection equals the marginal cost. Equality
between marginal bene￿t and marginal cost implies
(14) Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿i￿ =
Mi
Q
￿[￿iCm + Cc(￿ T ￿ ￿i)] ,
where Q =
P
j Mj￿j measures the strength of global patent protection in the Nash
equilibrium.
Observe ￿rst that as ￿i ! 0, the left-hand side of (14) approaches Cc ￿ Cm; a small
country captures virtually none of the monopoly pro￿ts from innovative products, so
the marginal cost of a patent per consumer and product is the di⁄erence between the
competitive and monopoly levels of consumer surplus. But as Mi ! 0, the right-hand
30McCalman (2001) estimates the income transfers implicit in TRIPs and ￿nds that international
patent harmonization bene￿ts the United States at the expense of the developing countries as well as
Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan. He does not, however, include in his calculations the bene￿ts
that countries derive from the global increase in innovative activities.
28side of (14) approaches zero, because a small country provides innovators with virtually
none of their global pro￿ts and so worldwide innovation is hardly responsive to a change
in such a country￿ s patent policy. It follows that a small country will set its index of
patent protection equal to zero in a Nash equilibrium.
If all countries choose positive patent strengths that are less than ￿ T, equation (14)
holds for every i. Then we can sum (14) across the J countries, which gives
(15) J (Cc ￿ Cm) ￿ ￿ = ￿
2
4Cm ￿ Cc +
Cc
￿P
j Mj
￿
￿ T
Q
3
5.
Then, for a given size of the world market, Q depends only on the number of countries J
and not on the distribution of consumers and human capital across countries. Moreover,
if ￿ ￿ 0, Q is a declining function of J; the greater is the number of countries, the
weaker are the global incentives for innovation in a noncooperative equilibrium. As the
number of countries grows large (holding constant the size of the world market), the
aggregate incentives for innovation approach zero.31 Evidently, the free-rider problem
becomes increasingly severe as the number of independent decision makers in the world
economy expands.
Finally, note that the requirements for global e¢ ciency do not depend on the number
of countries. Again, the sum of all national welfare levels is a function of the aggregate
world incentive for innovation. This sum is maximized when
(16) Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿ = ￿
2
4Cm ￿ Cc +
Cc
￿P
j Mj
￿
￿ T
Q￿
3
5.
Thus, if international compensation is possible, an e¢ cient global patent treaty will
have
P
j Mj￿j = Q￿, where Q￿ is solved from (16). Notice that Q￿ must exceed Q, the
aggregate patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. Even if international compensation
is not feasible, an e¢ cient agreement will have
P
j Mj￿j = Q￿ for a range of distributions
of world welfare.
31Suppose Q were to approach a ￿nite number as J ! 1. Then ￿ would approach a ￿nite number as
well, and the right-hand side of (15) would be ￿nite. But the left-hand side of (15) approaches in￿nity
as J ! 1.
29VI. Conclusions
We have developed a simple model of endogenous innovation and have used it to
study the incentives that governments face in choosing their patent policies. Our model
features a familiar trade-o⁄ between the static bene￿ts of competitive pricing and the
dynamic bene￿ts of increased innovation. For a closed economy, we derived a simple
formula for the optimal strength of patent protection that relates the deadweight loss
induced by a marginal strengthening of IPR protection to the surplus that results from
the extra innovation.
In an open economy, di⁄erences in market size and di⁄erences in capacity for R&D
generate national di⁄erences in optimal patent policies. We focused on policies that are
applied with national treatment; that is, regimes that require equal protection for foreign
and domestic applicants. A country￿ s optimal patent policy is found by equating the sum
of the extra deadweight loss that results from strengthening the IPR protection granted
to domestic ￿rms and the extra consumer surplus loss that results from expanding the
fraction of imported goods that are subject to monopoly pricing with the bene￿ts that
￿ ow from providing greater incentives for innovation to ￿rms worldwide. A country￿ s
optimal IPR protection depends on the policies set by its trading partner, because the
strength of foreign patent rights a⁄ects the responsiveness of global innovation to a
change in a country￿ s own patent policies.
We found that having a larger market for innovative products typically enhances a
government￿ s incentive to grant stronger patent rights. Also, a government￿ s relative
incentive to protect IPRs typically increases with its relative endowment of human cap-
ital. In a noncooperative equilibrium, patent protection will be stronger in the North
than in the South if the North has a larger market for innovative products and a greater
capacity for R&D.
Starting from a Nash equilibrium, countries can bene￿t from negotiating an interna-
tional patent agreement. A treaty can ensure that national policies re￿ ect the positive
externalities that ￿ ow to foreign residents when a country tightens its patent laws. To
achieve (constrained) e¢ ciency, an international agreement must strengthen aggregate
world patent protection relative to the Nash equilibrium. Harmonization of patent poli-
cies is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for the e¢ ciency of the global IPR regime. If
patent policies are harmonized at an e¢ cient level, the move from a Nash equilibrium
typically will bene￿t the North but possibly harm the South.
30Our conclusions are essentially the same for a world with more than two countries.
Countries with larger markets and more human capital will provide stronger IPRs in
a noncooperative equilibrium than those with smaller markets and less human capital.
Indeed, a country that is small in relation to the world economy has no incentive what-
soever to grant patents. The greater is the number of independent countries, the more
severe is the free-rider problem inherent in the setting of national patent policies. Thus,
the value of an international patent agreement grows with the number of independent
sovereign decision makers.
Our analysis can be extended to more general environments. For example, in an
earlier version of this paper (Grossman and Lai, 2002), we allowed for cross-national
di⁄erences in relative labor productivity in the two industries. With comparative ad-
vantage in production, the productivity gap in the industry that produces di⁄erentiated
products may not be o⁄set by the gap in relative wages. Then the production costs
for innovative products will be higher in one region or the other. This can create an
asymmetry in the life cycle of a new good depending upon whether patents are longer in
the North or in the South. We showed how such an asymmetry may generate multiple
equilibria in the policy game.
Another possible extension would allow di⁄erent preferences in di⁄erent countries.
With di⁄erent demands, the marginal cost of strengthening IPR protection will vary
around the globe. Then di⁄erences in the elasticities of demand for innovative products
will be another factor that a⁄ects the governments￿relative incentives for granting long
patents or providing strict enforcement. Moreover, asymmetries in demand would be
re￿ ected in the characteristics of a globally e¢ cient IPR regime. An e¢ cient regime
would equalize across countries the marginal deadweight loss associated with providing
a given push to global innovation. E¢ ciency requires stronger patent protection in
countries that have more inelastic demands for innovative products, all else the same.
31Appendix
In this appendix we show that, for a closed economy, when ￿ solves (7) and ￿ ￿ 1=2,
the second-order condition for an optimal patent policy is satis￿ed. Similar calculations
ensure that ￿ ￿ 1=2 is su¢ cient for the second-order condition to be satis￿ed for the
best response given by (11) for an open economy.
Let us rewrite the ￿rst-order condition (7) as
￿
￿
￿
Cc ￿ T ￿ ￿
￿
(Cc ￿ Cm) + (Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿)
1
￿
￿￿
= 0.
Since ￿=￿ > 0, the term in curly brackets must vanish at any local extremum. We will
show that at any such point the term in curly brackets is a decreasing function of ￿;
i.e., that
(A1) ￿
￿
(Cc ￿ Cm) + (Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿)
1
￿
￿ ￿
(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿)
￿2
d￿(￿)
d￿
￿
< 0.
This means that any point satisfying the ￿rst-order condition is a local welfare maximum.
Since the welfare function is continuous and di⁄erentiable, it follows that there can be
at most one local extremum point, and that the value of ￿ that generates this point is
the unique welfare-maximizing patent policy.
It is straightforward to calculate that
￿ ￿ ￿
"
(FL)
2
FFLL
#
=
b
(1 ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
LR
aH
￿￿
for the CES research technology. Meanwhile, vFL = w = 1=a and v = M￿￿ imply that
FL = 1=aM￿￿, or that
b
a
"
b + (1 ￿ b)
￿
aH
LR
￿￿# 1￿￿
￿
=
1
aM￿￿
in the CES case. Using these two equations, we can express ￿ as a function of ￿; we
￿nd that ￿ =
￿
b
1￿￿
￿h
(bM￿￿)
￿￿
1￿￿ ￿ b
i￿1
.
We can now compute d￿(￿)=d￿, and substitute the resulting expression into the
left-hand side of (A1), which then becomes
￿ = ￿
￿
Cc ￿ Cm ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) + (Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿)(bM￿￿)
￿￿
1￿￿
￿
1 ￿ 2￿
b
￿￿
.
32But ￿ ￿ 1=2 ensures that
￿ ￿ ￿[Cc ￿ Cm ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ 2￿)(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿) ]
= ￿[Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿(Cc ￿ Cm ￿ ￿)]
< 0 .
So the second-order condition is satis￿ed when ￿ ￿ 1=2 and the ￿ that solves (7) ￿if it
exists ￿is the unique welfare-maximizing patent policy.
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